Playing a quantum game with a corrupted source

The quantum advantage arising in a simplified multi-player quantum game, is found to be a disadvantage when the game's qubit-source is corrupted by a noisy "demon". Above a critical value of the corruption-rate, or noise-level, the coherent quantum effects impede the players to such an extent that the optimal choice of game changes from quantum to classical.Comment: This version will appear in PRA (Rapid Comm.

CORRECTION OF TRANSIENT SOLID-EMBEDDED THERMOCOUPLE DATA WITH APPLICATION TO INVERSE HEAT CONDUCTION

The current research investigates the use of solid-embedded thermocouples for determining accurate transient temperature measurements within a solid medium, with emphasis on measurements intended for use in inverse heat conduction problems. Metal casting experiments have been conducted to collect internal mold temperatures to be used, through inverse conduction methods, to estimate the heat exchange between a casting and mold. Inverse conduction methods require accurate temperature measurements for valid boundary estimates. Therefore, various sources of thermocouple measurement uncertainty are examined and some suggestions for uncertainty reduction are presented. Thermocouple installation induced bias uncertainties in experimental temperature data are dynamically corrected through the development and implementation of an embedded thermocouple correction (ETC) transfer function. Comparisons of experimental data to dynamically adjusted data, as well as the inverse conduction estimates for heat flux from each data set, are presented and discussed

Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L-> N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.Comment: 4 pages (Revtex) + 6 separate pdf figure

Generalized strategies in the Minority Game

We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can be made to decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general behavioral strategies. This suppression of the standard deviation results from a cancellation between the actions of a crowd, in which agents act collectively and make the same decision, and an anticrowd in which agents act collectively by making the opposite decision to the crowd.Comment: Revised manuscript: a few minor typos corrected. Results unaffecte

Crowd-anticrowd theory of the Minority Game

The Minority Game is a simple yet highly non-trivial agent-based model for a complex adaptive system. Despite its importance, a quantitative explanation of the game's fluctuations which applies over the entire parameter range of interest has so far been lacking. We provide such a quantitative description based on the interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and their anti-correlated partners (anticrowds).Comment: Shortened version of cond-mat/0003486. Submitted for publicatio

An NMR-based nanostructure switch for quantum logic

We propose a nanostructure switch based on nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) which offers reliable quantum gate operation, an essential ingredient for building a quantum computer. The nuclear resonance is controlled by the magic number transitions of a few-electron quantum dot in an external magnetic field.Comment: 4 pages, 2 separate PostScript figures. Minor changes included. One reference adde

Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution

We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An evolutionary rule for strategy modification is included to mimic simple learning. The results can be understood by considering crowd formation within the population.Comment: Revtex file + 4 figure

Volatility and Agent Adaptability in a Self-Organizing Market

We present results for the so-called `bar-attendance' model of market behavior: $p$ adaptive agents, each possessing $n$ prediction rules chosen randomly from a pool, attempt to attend a bar whose cut-off is $s$. The global attendance time-series has a mean near, but not equal to, $s$. The variance, or `volatility', can show a minimum with increasing adaptability of the individual agents.Comment: 8 pages, 3 figs. [email protected], [email protected]

Anatomy of extreme events in a complex adaptive system

We provide an analytic, microscopic analysis of extreme events in an adaptive population comprising competing agents (e.g. species, cells, traders, data-packets). Such large changes tend to dictate the long-term dynamical behaviour of many real-world systems in both the natural and social sciences. Our results reveal a taxonomy of extreme events, and provide a microscopic understanding as to their build-up and likely duration.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures. Now with Postscript figure

Influence of external information in the minority game

The influence of a fixed number of agents with the same fixed behavior on the dynamics of the minority game is studied. Alternatively, the system studied can be considered the minority game with a change in the comfort threshold away from half filling. Agents in the frustrated, non ergodic phase tend to overreact to the information provided by the fixed agents, leading not only to large fluctuations, but to deviations of the average occupancies from their optimal values. Agents which discount their impact on the market, or which use individual strategies reach equilibrium states, which, unlike in the absence of the external information provided by the fixed agents, do not give the highest payoff to the collective.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figure